

A
HISTORY OF ENGLAND

PRINCIPALLY

IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

BY

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VOLUME II

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BOOK VI.

GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND WITHOUT THE PAR-
LIAMENT. TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND.

CHAPTER I.

PEACE WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN.

IF we consider the embarrassment in which Charles I had been involved by his conduct of the war, we are tempted to assume that, in order to extricate himself from it, he must have opened negotiations with the two great powers with which he was at war whilst they were still at variance with one another. This however was not the case.

Negotiations with France were opened at the instigation of the powers combined to resist Spain, between which an agreement had first been set on foot by James I, and had been renewed by Buckingham. Those powers regarded the breach between England and France as a misfortune, which they must endeavour to obviate if they would carry on the war against Austria and Spain with full vigour. The Republic of Venice, which felt itself most seriously threatened by these powers, made a great point of promoting a reconciliation between France and England by the agency of its ambassadors.

A few days before his unhappy end, Buckingham withdrew with the Venetian ambassador, Aluise Contarini, into a retired chamber in one of his country-houses, and there concerted with him a letter of pacific import to his brother envoy in France, for him to communicate to the French court¹. While Buckingham was preparing to strike a blow, he still hoped to procure

¹ Aluise Contarini, 20 Agosto 1628: 'Essendo trattenuto ben quatro hore a disputar, resolver et adomesticar il negotio: sempre coll' assistenza di Carleton che in questo fatto si è portato egregiamente.'

from France tolerable conditions for the besieged town of Rochelle. All other difficulties he thought might then be removed in a couple of hours.

But Buckingham was assassinated. When the Venetians after this event brought their negotiations before the King, who as yet knew nothing about them, he even refused to hear them. He quite recognised the necessity of finding some arrangement: 'I acknowledge all that,' he said one day to the ambassador; 'but,' he added, 'I have arms in my hands, not to negotiate, but to save the town. My honour is at stake¹.'

Though Rochelle, as we have seen, failed to hold out, the result cannot be ascribed to King Charles. After Lindsay's attempt to break through the mole had proved unsuccessful—we do not quite know whether on account of the superiority of the French, or from the above-mentioned deficiencies on the side of the English—Charles I gave orders to renew the attempt again, without any regard to the danger to his ships, and not to retire from the town whatever might be the cost². On this the council of war had in fact resolved to lead the ships against the palisades by a way hitherto untried, when the town, despairing of help and overpowered by unendurable hardships, capitulated.

After the fall of Rochelle the Venetians resumed their attempts at mediation with redoubled ardour. King Charles was brought into a more favourable frame of mind by the tolerable conditions granted to the town in regard to the profession of religion, and by the evident impossibility of doing anything effectual in France: and Contarini now found him inclined to listen. But the ambassador was considerate enough not to urge the King, after he had been beaten in the strife, now to make overtures for its adjustment³: the negotiations were left more than ever in the hands of the Venetian ambassador in France, Zorzo Zorzi.

¹ 'Tutto è vero, ma il mio honor importa più.'

² 'That they should hazard for the relief of the town all his ships, that he proposed not to have it left re infecta, whatever it might cost.' Mead to Stuteville, in Ellis iii. 269.

³ Contarini, Nov. 18. 'Non può con doppio dishonore et parlare et perdere.'

They were principally concerned with two points. The French demanded above all the execution of the provisions laid down in the marriage contract for the constitution of the Queen's household. Charles I not only refused to revert to these, he even rejected the conditions which he had consented to when Bassompierre was in England, and which the French at that time did not accept. He insisted that her court should continue as it was. He had made other arrangements for filling the offices in the household;—how could he take away their places again from the English lords and ladies who were in possession of them? He would not have any misunderstandings at his court, in his house, and as he said plainly, in his marriage bed. The Venetian ambassador in England remarked that it would be disadvantageous to the Queen if these demands were persisted in. And she herself also had already begged that they should be dropped, on the ground that she was satisfied with the present arrangements of her court: she did not even think fit to write about them to her mother¹. However disagreeable it might be for the Queen-mother herself, and for the zealous advocates of the Church about her, her son and Cardinal Richelieu sympathised with the point of view of Charles I, or else they saw that he would not give it up: at all events they contented themselves with stipulating that, if an alteration in the court were necessary, they should come to an amicable arrangement on the subject, to suit the requirements of the Queen's service². Even these words were merely accepted by the English in the avowed expectation that they would never be used to disturb the repose of the kingdom, or the mode of life of the King³. In brief, the execution of the former stipulations was given up by the French. In this matter, which most nearly concerned King Charles, he carried the day.

¹ Contarini to Zorzi: 'Mi manda a dire in molta confidenza che non vorrebbe disgustar il re interessandosi troppo in questo affare.'

² 'S'il y a quelque chose à ajouter ou à diminuer, se fera de part et d'autre de gré à gré.' *Traité de paix fait à Suze, 24 Avril 1629, Art. iv. Dumont v. ii. 580.*

³ Zorzi to Contarini, Jan. 20, 1629: 'Che la Francia non vorrebbe servirsene, che da sola apparenza senza sturbar il riposo del re et il gusto degli Inglesi.'

The second point affected the old connexion between the English and the Huguenots. The former had hitherto claimed to regulate through their intervention, and to fix by compact, the relations between the French government and the Reformed Churches. Buckingham had already been disposed to drop this claim: and after the last turn which affairs had taken, there could be no more thought of maintaining it. The English plenipotentiaries were satisfied with a general pardon bestowed on the Huguenots by the King of France, reserving to them their Protestant worship. But the English had wished that it should be indicated, if even by the slightest expressions, that this concession was the effect of the peace¹. Not that it should be a condition of the agreement, nor even that any interest in the result should be ascribed to England, but something was to be said about regard for peace as the foremost public good, and about the joint action between the two nations which was in immediate prospect. They thought that this was demanded by their honour, and they would not at once renounce all common feeling with the Calvinists. But the French returned a decided refusal. True as it was that the concessions that were vouchsafed to the Huguenots were based on the necessity of a closer connexion with England and Holland, which but for these could not have been agreed on, yet the French would not allow any hint of this to be dropped. They would have feared that occasion might thus be given for interference at some future time: in any case the authority of the government would have been damaged. The Venetian ambassador in London makes a merit of inducing Charles I finally to desist from this request. The principal reason alleged by him in support of his advice was that not only a question of religion, but an actual rebellion was here concerned, inasmuch as the Huguenots had leagued with Spain².

Thus was this peace concluded at Susa, April 1, 1629. In

¹ Contarini to Zorzi, Nov. 21: 'Questo parte (l'Inglese) piu non insiste d'esserne direttrice—punto grande guadagnatosi—ma vederebbe volentieri che Ugonotti non si dolessero da lei che li havesse abbandonati et il re vi ha riflesso.'

² A. Contarini designates this view as 'la massima con la quale credo d'haver portato questo negozio.' (8 Giugno 1629).

estimating the historical relations of the two kingdoms in general, great importance must be assigned to it. What had been brought about in the times of the Normans and Plantagenets, and once more during the great wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—I mean a most intimate connexion of French and English interest—had, as it were, repeated itself, although on a far smaller scale, during the religious wars. In the times of Queen Elizabeth and James I the French Reformed ranged themselves under the influence of England: even in the time of Charles I this had not ceased. On the other hand the French had sought to establish a counter-acting influence on their side, especially by the late marriage contract. Neither of the two governments profited by this. In the peace of Susa they agreed to desist from this mutual action on one another. The French resigned the literal fulfilment of the marriage contract: the English renounced the connexion with the Huguenots which had hitherto been acknowledged. Relations into which religion entered could not be avoided, but the political sting, so to speak, was taken out of them. In France from that date the ascendancy of Catholicism could more decidedly be erected into a principle of the state: in England the court once more asserted its Protestant character.

For the moment the result of the peace was to untie the hands of France for the conflict with Spain. Every one knows what vast dimensions this assumed: it set fresh enmity between the parts of the world of that day which it rent asunder, and laid the foundation of the state of affairs which prevailed in the following epoch.

While France carried her arms into Italy, in order to force back the Spanish influence there, the King of England was to direct his forces to North Germany, in order to check the spreading power of the Emperor and the League. Maritime affairs at that time principally attracted the general attention. Wallenstein advanced a claim to sovereignty over the Baltic, but at the same time he intended to hold the ports of the German Ocean and the mouth of the Elbe in behalf of the Empire: and a combination between the Hanseatic shipping and the Spanish naval power was contemplated.

Roused by this unexpected danger, the Kings of Sweden and Denmark held a conference in February 1629 on the confines of the province of Halland, and united to defend the 'Regalia of the northern crowns on the Baltic sea'.¹ The Danish ambassador exerted himself most zealously to kindle the sympathies of the Dutch and English also. And in fact the King of England, in transmitting the official notification of the peace with France, announced to the States-General that he had sent a squadron under Pennington and Colonel Mackay to the Elbe in order to encourage the King of Denmark², and he invited the Dutch likewise to support him. A short time before, Colonel Morgan with another considerable body of troops, among whom were newly enlisted French and Scots, had started from the islands of Sylt and Föhr and made an attack upon the troops of the Empire and of Gottorp at Nordstrand. But at this moment, when a new coalition embracing the South, West, and North of Europe, was again just about to be formed to check the advance of the house of Austria, Denmark, which was to have been supported in the first instance, came to an agreement with that power. In the beginning of June, at Lübeck, King Christian IV renounced his operations against the German empire; but in return he received back without loss of a foot of land his possessions in Holstein and Jutland, the greater part of which was in the hands of the enemy. If we ask what induced the Imperialists to make so extensive a concession, it was no doubt anxiety about that maritime coalition, for which great exertions were being made at Copenhagen. Even without this aid the Danish fleet was able to defend itself with much more success than the army: the Imperial and German navies, with all their combined force, were still far from being a match for it. The generals were afraid of reverses, and of a mischievous action

¹ Cp. Slange ii. i. 378. Schlegel's doubts are done away by the news which Anstruther gave to England about the 'abboccamento seguito tra il re di Danimarca e Suecia, et i buoni concerti stabiliti tra loro per difesa del mar Baltico.' *Dispaccio Veneto* 1 Mayo, 1629.

² Aitzema: *Saken van staet en orloogh* i. 243. Contarini avers that the squadron, consisting of five ships, had gone in the direction of the Elbe.

of the Danish fleet upon the coast towns of which they had taken possession, and upon the German empire in general¹. Charles I had just sent one of his ablest and most zealous diplomatists, Thomas Roe, a particular friend of his sister the Electress Palatine, to Hamburg, in order to bring about a northern alliance between the two kings, the Republic, and the Hanse towns². He hoped still to delay the ratification of the treaty between Denmark and Austria, and to make it abortive. But all was in vain; the peace was far too advantageous to Denmark for the Danish councillors to give it up again.

Upon this most of the adversaries of Austria and Spain, even those in Italy, directed their gaze to the King of Sweden. The forces of the Emperor, which were no longer engaged with Denmark, were now twice as dangerous to him, and he appeared quite ready to take up arms if he should be supported by France and England. Cardinal Richelieu showed an inclination, if England would send a fleet to sea against Spain, to furnish a third of the vessels, and to make common cause in general with that power: he only wished that the undertaking should be carried out in the name of England. But the withdrawal of Denmark had quite a different effect upon the King of England, to whom the preservation of his uncle had supplied a motive for taking arms: he inclined on the contrary to follow the example set him by that prince. The Lord Treasurer Weston, who had to provide the money, looked upon the Danish peace as a relief: he breathed more freely when it had been concluded; for after the unhappy results of the last Parliament the want of money was so sorely felt by the government, that no one reckoned upon their fulfilling their engagements, and they themselves would undertake none. And such great injury had been inflicted on trade by the war, that the whole people

¹ 'Istis locis nullam esse classem, deesse navigia, quibus bellum mari possit sustineri,—Danis in promptu esse classem quam indies Sueci, Angli, Batavi novis augeant subsidiis.' Extract from the report of the Generals in Adlzreiter, *Ann. Boici* iii. 1821.

² Contarini, 29 Giugno: 'Per unir seco con qualche buon concerto tutto questo settentrione.'

the spiritual laws, his authority reverted to those by whom it had been conferred, that is to say, the Estates. It was only the departure of Henry III from the capital, and the military exploits of Henry IV, that preserved the personal authority of the French kings.

We may perceive at a glance the manifold analogies between the English events of which we are now treating, and those which had taken place in France half a century earlier. Both began through a desire to make the recognition of the exclusive dominance of one religion effectively binding on a government not decidedly inclined to that party: in both the one-sided tolerance displayed by the princes formed one of the chief grounds of complaint against them: the demand was not only for the full execution of the ecclesiastical laws, but also for the unconditional validity of the resolutions passed by the assembly of the Estates wherein these opinions prevailed, for periodic meetings of the Estates, and the dependence on them of the highest officials and of the entire administration—with this difference, that what in the one kingdom was desired for the benefit of Catholicism, in the other was meant to aid the Protestant cause. The religious principles were opposed to one another, the political were to a large extent identical.

In England however all was more deeply rooted and more firmly established than in France. The preponderance of Parliament was far more a matter of historical usage than the power of the Three Estates in France: it had grown up in far more intimate union with the feelings and habits of men. Further, while in France the motives derived from foreign connexions occupied the whole foreground, and were as clear as daylight, in England such motives were weaker and more obscure: the movement assumed a prevailing national colour. When at last after long disputes every chance of a peaceful result had vanished, it was obvious that in England the war must involve far greater danger to the crown. From the different development of the contending principles in the two countries arose the divergence in their later history. At that time the English crown was not yet without military resources, and the example of France might serve as an encouragement

to challenge the fortunes of war on the King's behalf. The English capital had taken as active a part in favour of the Puritan Parliament as the French capital for the exclusively Catholic Estates. Charles I had been obliged to quit Westminster and London as Henry III had quitted Paris: since the successor of the latter had within a few years made himself master of Paris, and had brought about a reaction at least in politics, might not the same future be possible for Charles I also?

pendent government under the third prince, the Duke of Gloucester, the Queen thought that even this would be better than that Charles I should in solemn form deprive himself of his power, and clothe Parliament with it. Cardinal Mazarin fully concurred in all this; for they durst not let it come to pass that the King should remain such in name only¹.

Two points especially of the propositions repeated at Newcastle appeared to France inadmissible; one, that the power to dispose of the army and to raise the means necessary for its maintenance should be given over for twenty years, dating from July 1, 1646, into the hands of the Parliament, as well in Scotland as in England and Ireland; the other that a great list should be drawn up of classes of persons disqualified to receive any amnesty, comprising all those, Scots as well as Englishmen, who had ever supported the King's cause in the field or in negotiations.

The French statesmen had a double motive for not wishing to give the Independents the opportunity of possessing themselves of the supreme authority: they were afraid of their anti-monarchical doctrines and their general influence in Europe, but moreover they feared that Great Britain might form a compact power on principles opposite to their own. They did not however mean to avert these dangers by recommending concessions which were contrary to monarchy as understood in France, but by influence over the Scots and renewal of their league with them.

Bellièvre, who in his earlier mission had worked chiefly for this object, was instructed to represent to them his astonishment that, after giving the King, when at the advice of France and to their great advantage he came to their camp, reason to hope for more favourable terms, they should now wish to compel him to accept less favourable ones: they would in this way make an enemy for ever of their King, who might yet recover his power: but if they would support him now,

¹ A. Bellièvre, 6 Août 'Je suis bien de cet avis, qu'il vaudroit mieux attendre toutes les violences que le parlement pourroit commettre, même celle a déposséder le roi, mais non pas que luy même consentist qu'on ne luy laissait que le nom et la figure du roi, qu'on ne manqueroit pas de luy oster peu de temps après.'

France would be for ever bound to them, would not only secure them against the enmity of the English, but would even take their part if Charles I should ever break his promises to them, and would be inclined in the pending negotiations for a general peace to make the concessions necessary for attaining it, so as to be able in the next spring, before there was anything to be apprehended even from the Independent army, to give them help¹.

France was at this time at the height of her military power and political influence in the world: she hoped before the end of the year to establish her position by the conclusion of peace at Munster: and then it was the purpose of her leading minister to interfere actively in English affairs, and support with all his strength the union between Charles I and the Scots, which he hoped meanwhile to bring to completion².

For this connexion concessions were necessary, and the French court was entirely in favour of their being made, but not of so comprehensive a kind as was demanded. Queen Henrietta Maria warned her husband afresh against accepting the Covenant; but she admitted that Bellièvre was right in thinking that the Episcopalian system must be given up. She well knew, she said, how distasteful this was to the King, and it was equally so to herself, but there was no means of saving the bishops without ruining himself. If he fell they were irretrievably lost, whereas he might restore them, if he again attained power. All seemed to her to depend on his not giving up his prerogative in relation to the armed force, the right of the militia; for then he would have the means, and God would give him still more—she meant French help—to restore all. The disorder in Ireland was dying out: she had received from Scotland offers of great importance, and from the Queen of Sweden satisfactory assurances of friendship.

¹ 'En cas qu'ils se disposent a faire leur devoir, on se relâchera d'icy en beaucoup de choses pour faciliter la conclusion de la paix generale, affin de nous mettre en etat de les secourir.'

² Henrietta Maria to Charles I, Oct. 9/19, 1646. 'Cl. Mazarin m'a assure que la paix generale seroit faite devant Noel, et cela estant, on vous assisteroit puissamment.'

